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Supreme Guidance for Wet Growth:
Lessons from the High Court on the Powers
and Responsibilities of Local Governments
Michael Allan Wolf1
I. INTRODUCTION: MOVING WET GROWTH FROM
IDEA TO IMPLEMENTATION
When Chapman University School of Law last assembled a
set of nationally recognized experts to discuss the idea of managing growth through water law, the convener, Professor Tony Arnold, did a masterful job of summing up the “Wet Growth”
movement.2 He noted,
There is a need for a concept of “wet growth”: integration of concerns
about water quality and the availability of water supply into the density, form, pattern, and location of land development. This “wet
growth idea”—that growth and land use should be sustainable with
respect to aquatic ecosystems and water resources—may simply be an
aspect of a broad smart growth agenda (or an even broader sustainability agenda) or may carve out its own identity as a planning and
regulatory concept.3

While several commentators (academics and practitioners
alike) have endorsed this merger of water law and planning, and
although there has been some experimentation on (and below)
the ground, we have not yet seen widespread adoption of integrative controls on the local and state level. In other words, there
has not yet been an extensive shift from the idea stage to the implementation stage.
Before such a shift can occur, local and state regulators need
1 Richard E. Nelson Chair in Local Government Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. The author thanks two outstanding University of Florida law students—
Leslie Utiger and Steven Wernick—for their first-rate research assistance. This article
was prepared for, and presented as part of, the well-organized and provocative Chapman
Law Review Symposium on “The Slippery Slope: Urban Runoff, Water Quality, and the
Issue of Legal Authority,” January 27, 2006, Chapman University School of Law.
2 Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Is Wet Growth Smarter Than Smart Growth?: The
Fragmentation and Integration of Land Use and Water, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10152 (2005);
see also WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE (Craig Anthony (Tony)
Arnold ed. 2005) (including chapters written by participants at a conference at Chapman
University School of Law in February, 2003) [hereinafter WET GROWTH].
3 Arnold, supra note 2, at 10154.
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strong guidance from experts in the field, not only in extra-legal
fields such as planning, hydrology, geology, engineering, biology,
and transportation, but also in mainstream legal areas including
legislation (local, state, and federal), administrative law, and enforcement. The purpose of this article is to identify a somewhat
unorthodox source of guidance—the United States Supreme
Court, specifically the Rehnquist Court from October, 1984,
through June, 2005, a period of remarkable stability for the nation’s highest tribunal. From the October 1994 Term, when Associate Justice Stephen Breyer joined the Court, through the October 2004 Term, after which Chief Justice William Rehnquist
died, the membership of the Court did not change, making it the
longest-serving group of nine Justices in the history of the
Court.4
Part II of this article presents a hypothetical local jurisdiction—appropriately named Hydro City—which is experimenting
with various wet growth controls. The purpose of the controls is
to regulate land development to minimize harm to precious water
resources in and around the community. Part III shifts the locus
of the article from the mythical community to the very real Supreme Court building in the nation’s capital, in which nine Justices sit, deliberate, and formulate opinions on a wide range of
important topics. This section of the article asks the reader to
conceive of the modern Supreme Court not as a “court of the last
resort,” but as a body of legal commentators.
The powers and responsibilities of local governments comprised one of the significant areas addressed by the legal commentators comprising the Rehnquist Court from the eleven terms
during which there was no change in Court membership, as demonstrated in Part IV. This article refers to several Supreme
Court cases involving local governments, decided during those selected Terms, which contain lessons from the commentators pertinent to the application of wet growth controls. The facts, outcomes, and rationales of fourteen, highly relevant cases are
reviewed, along with the specific lessons they provide.
Part V returns the reader to Hydro City and includes four
examples that illustrate how the Court’s lessons can afford guidance to wet growth regulators, to landowners and developers,
4 See The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Nine Justices, Ten Years: A Statistical Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510, 510, 510 n.1 (2004) (noting that “[t]he 2003 Term
marked an unprecedented milestone for the Supreme Court: for the first time in history,
nine Justices celebrated a full decade presiding together over the nation’s highest court,”
and that “[a] seven-Justice Court sat together for more than a decade only once, from Justice Joseph Story’s appointment in 1812 to Justice Brockholst Livingston’s death in
1823.).
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and to the public and private sector attorneys who represent
their interests. The article concludes with observations concerning the potential usefulness of the Rehnquist Court’s lessons in
furthering the goals of advocates of wet growth controls.
II. WET GROWTH CONTROLS IN HYDRO CITY
The imaginary municipality of Hydro City is the county seat
of Orange County, located on the coast of Califlorida. Hydro
City’s population stands at one million, and the city is experiencing extreme pressures to grow even more rapidly. The city is located in one of most attractive regions in one of the nation’s most
populous states, a state that features a long coastal border, many
freshwater lakes, and a temperate climate. The Tributaria River
flows through the center of Hydro City and empties into the
ocean only twenty miles away.
Concerned about the negative externalities attending unbridled real estate development—including, but certainly not limited to, nonpoint source pollution of sensitive surface water bodies and groundwater, the destruction of functional wetlands, and
the destruction of critical habitat for endangered and threatened
species—the Hydro City Council, after two years of study and
consultation with scientific, engineering, legal and planning experts, followed by extensive public hearings, announced a package of proposed new regulations and enforcement strategies.
• Hydro City’s proposed “wet growth package” consists
of the following ten tools:
• Development moratoria;5
• Riparian buffer zones;6
• Prohibition of certain uses in lands bordering water
bodies;7
• Density limitations in watersheds;8
• Aquifer recharge overlay zones prohibiting some uses
5 See Arnold, supra note 2, at 10156 (noting that “growth moratoria imposed because of water concerns have fared much better” than “[t]he use of moratoria on new water supplies in order to control or stop growth”); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (upholding set of development moratoria in face of regulatory takings challenge).
6 See Arnold, supra note 2, at 10173 (“it is also becoming common for local or state
governments to adopt riparian or shoreline buffer zones that restrict development within
a certain distance of river banks, stream banks, and lake shores.”); see also Alan W. Flenner, Municipal Riparian Buffer Regulations in Pennsylvania—Confronting the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 207 (1998) (discussing riparian buffer
regulations in Kennett Township, Chester County, Pennsylvania).
7 See Arnold, supra note 2, at 10156–57.
8 See id.
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and requiring special use permits or the use of best
management practices (BMPs) for other uses;9
• Aggressive enforcement of existing regulations
against certain developers;10
• Variable water pricing, increasing cost as usage
rises;11
• Performance zoning standards;12
• Incentive and bonus zoning;13 and
• Conditional grants of building permits.14
In many ways, city officials have cherry-picked some of the
wet growth controls that show the greatest potential for success
in restricting development that poses the greatest harms to sensitive water bodies and in encouraging positive steps by those
who choose to make more intensive use of land.
Not surprisingly, given the litigious climate that has long
typified the American ethos, landowners and developers in the
region who are skeptical about most, if not all of these proposed
regulations, have already lined up some skillful legal talent to
investigate the possibility of a frontal attack on any new tools
that the local government chooses to employ. Indeed, several legal activists who champion private property rights have offered
their services in the national struggle against regulations these
true believers deem to be confiscatory, arbitrary, and retributive.15
Rather than wait for the inevitable facial or as-applied challenge to their wet growth tools, counsel for the city should—
before the local legislature votes on any ordinances and before local regulators implement new enforcement policies, incentives, or
conditional permitting—conduct research into the legality, feasibility, and advisability of the proposed package.

9

Texas).

See id. at 10157 (describing the Edwards Aquifer Recharge Zone in San Antonio,

10 See id. at 10157–58 (citing actions taken by the Santa Ana Regional Water Quality Control Board against a well-known developer in Orange County, California).
11 See id. at 10159 (quoting Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Management and Land
Use Planning: Is It Time for Closer Coordination?, in WET GROWTH, supra note 2, at 103).
12 See Arnold, supra note 2, at 10173.
13 See id. at 10174.
14 See id.
15 See, e.g., Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of
Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2163 n.14 (2002) (“The ‘property
rights movement’ has been active in promoting takings legislation and in supporting court
challenges to allegedly confiscatory land-use and environmental regulations . . . .”); see
also Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and
Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 511 (1998).
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Most of research sources consulted by the local government
attorneys will be routine: ordinances from other Califlorida
communities, state and federal decisional law, and the commentary written by experts from law, environmental science, and related fields. As the next part of this article explains, today there
is one additional source of guidance available to Hydro City’s
counsel and to the living and breathing local government attorneys who are actually advising real municipalities—the legal
commentary of the Rehnquist Court.
III. CONCEIVING OF THE HIGH COURT AS A BODY OF LEGAL
COMMENTATORS
Very earlier in the tribunal’s history, when the Justices still
“rode circuit,” members of the United States Supreme Court were
fairly accurately viewed as a court of last resort.16 In fact, a
variation on that phrase was employed by the Justices in their
respectful, but resistant, response to President George Washington’s request (forwarded by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson
on July 18, 1793) for the judges’ advice regarding important issues facing the new nation struggling to maintain its neutrality
as war consumed Europe:
The war which has taken place among the powers of Europe produces
frequent transactions within our ports and limits, on which questions
arise of considerable difficulty, and of greater importance to the peace
of the United States. These questions depend for their solution on the
construction of our treaties, on the laws of nature and nations, and on
the laws of the land, and are often presented under circumstances
which do not give a cognisance of them to the tribunals of the country.17

Chief Justice John Jay and his colleagues responded:
We have considered the previous question stated in a letter written by
your direction to us by the Secretary of State on the 18th of last month
[regarding] the lines of separation drawn by our Constitution between
the three departments of the government. These being in certain respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the
last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments against
the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to,
16 See, e.g., 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 58
(rev. ed. 1926) (“By the provisions of [the Judiciary Act], the country had been divided into
three Circuits (the Eastern, Middle, and Southern), to each of which two Supreme Court
Judges were permanently assigned and directed to hold Court twice a year in each District, in company with the District Judges.”).
17 LETTER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO JOHN JAY, JULY 18, 1793, reprinted in 4 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 257 (Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph Lerner eds., The University of Chicago Press 1987); see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 354 (1911)
(quoting 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1970).

03) 233-264 WOLF (PAGENUM, HYPH, EN&EM).DOC

238

Chapman Law Review

6/30/2006 12:47:12 PM

[Vol. 9:233

especially as the power [given] by the Constitution to the President, of
calling on the heads of departments for opinions, seems to have been
purposely as well as expressly united to the executive departments.18

By the third decade of the twentieth century, however, with the
development of certiorari review and a restructuring of the federal judiciary,19 the High Court’s role had begun to shift significantly.
Today, district courts and courts of appeal resolve the overwhelming majority of disputes in the federal system.20 As the
number of cases decided by lower federal courts skyrocketed in
the closing years of the last century, the Supreme Court significantly reduced its caseload.21 For example, in 1965, the Warren
Court Justices granted certiorari review in twelve percent of the
cases not filed in forma pauperis (124 cases were granted review
out of 1,164 cases on the docket).22 Ten years later, the number
of such cases on the docket of the Burger Court climbed to 2,352,
while the number of cases reviewed nearly doubled to 244 (ten
18 LETTER FROM JOHN JAY TO GEORGE WASHINGTON ON AUGUST 8, 1793, reprinted in
4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 258 (Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph Lerner eds., The
University of Chicago Press 1987) (emphasis added); see also Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 354
(quoting 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1970).
19 See Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent,
Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267 (2001).
Professor Post observed:
The [Judiciary Act of February 13, 1925] represented a fundamental transformation of the role of the Supreme Court. Before the Act, the Court was primarily a tribunal of ultimate resort; it was the highest and the last source of
appellate review, whose chief function was correctly to discern and to protect
the federal rights of litigants. But the Act’s sharp constriction of the Court’s
mandatory appellate jurisdiction “completely overrode” this “obstinate conception that the Court was to be the vindicator of all federal rights.” And the Act’s
extraordinary enlargement of the Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction
expressed a profound recharacterization of the Court’s function.
Id. at 1272–73 (footnotes omitted) (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 260–61 (1928)); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1643 (2000).
20 For statistical analysis, see CAROL KRAFKA ET. AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STALKING
THE INCREASE IN THE RATE OF FEDERAL CIVIL APPEALS (1995), available at http://www.
fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rate_of_appeal.pdf/$File/rate_of_appeal.pdf; see also Leonidas
Ralph Mecham, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures (Mar. 2005),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/alljfftables.pdf.
21 See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP.
CT. REV. 403, 403–04. Professor Hellman observed:
In the 1970s, when the Supreme Court was giving plenary consideration to 150
cases a Term, the courts of appeals were deciding about 10,000 cases on the
merits annually. Today the number of merits decisions by the courts of appeals
exceeds 25,000 each year.
Id. at 404.
22 LEE EPSTEIN ET. AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS 69 (3d ed. 2003).
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percent).23 Only twenty years later, the Rehnquist Court granted
review in ninety-two of such cases, only four percent of the 2,456
filed.24 The numbers of reviews granted in in forma pauperis
cases showed a similar pattern: Although 1,610 of such cases
were filed in 1965, 2,395 in 1975, and 5,098 in 1995, the percentage of cases granted certiorari review fell from three percent in
1965 (forty-three cases), to one percent in 1975 (twenty-eight
cases), and three-tenths of a percent in 1995 (thirteen cases).25
During the first Term that William H. Rehnquist served as
Chief Justice, the Court issued opinions in 159 cases,26 a number
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 69–71.
The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1, 304 (1986).
The figures in this paragraph derive from the Harvard Law Review’s annual statistical
review of the work of the Supreme Court over the previous Term (“The Statistics.”). Here
is a summary of the annual number of cases in which the Supreme Court issued opinions
for the last twenty-six, full Terms:
1979 Term (Berger, C.J.)—149
23
24
25
26

1980 Term—138
1981 Term—167
1982 Term—162
1983 Term—163
1984 Term—151
1985 Term (Rehnquist, C.J.)—159
1986 Term—152
1987 Term—142
1988 Term—143
1989 Term—139
1990 Term—120
1991 Term—116
1992 Term—114
1993 Term—87
1994 Term—86
1995 Term—79
1996 Term—86
1997 Term—93
1998 Term—81
1999 Term—77
2000 Term—86
2001 Term—81
2002 Term—78
2003 Term—83
2004 Term—79.
The above figures derive from the corresponding Harvard Law Review Leading CasesStatistics summary printed annually:
The Supreme Court, 1979 Term- The Statistics, 94 HARV. L. REV. 289, 289 (1980); The
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in line with that of several of the preceding terms. By the 1990
Term, the total number of opinions issued decreased to 120
(down nineteen from the previous year), and then dropped to 116
(1991 Term) and 114 (1992 Term).27 For the twelve remaining
Rehnquist Court Terms, the totals ranged from a high of ninetythree cases (1997 Term) to a low of seventy-seven cases (1999
Term).28 Given these reduced numbers, it might be hard for
some to realize that, during the 1970s and 1980s, there was active debate over various proposals to reduce the Supreme Court’s
heavy workload, such as the “‘creation of a National Court of Appeals which would screen all petitions for review now filed in the
Supreme Court, and hear and decide on the merits many cases of
conflicts between the circuits.’”29
The reduced number of cases resulting in fewer Court opinSupreme Court, 1980 Term- The Statistics, 95 HARV. L. REV. 339, 339 (1981); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term- The Statistics, 96 HARV. L. REV. 304, 304 (1982); The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term- The Statistics, 97 HARV. L. REV. 295, 295 (1983); The Supreme Court,
1983 Term- The Statistics, 98 HARV. L. REV. 307, 307 (1984); The Supreme Court, 1984
Term- The Statistics, 99 HARV. L. REV. 322, 322 (1985); The Supreme Court, 1985 TermThe Statistics, 100 HARV. L. REV. 304, 304 (1986); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term- The
Statistics, 101 HARV. L. REV. 362, 362 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1987 Term- The Statistics, 102 HARV. L. REV. 350, 350 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term- The Statistics,
103 HARV. L. REV. 394, 394 (1989); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term- The Statistics, 104
HARV. L. REV. 359, 359 (1990); The Supreme Court, 1990 Term- The Statistics, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 419, 419 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term- The Statistics, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 378, 378 (1992); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term- The Statistics, 107 HARV. L. REV.
372, 372 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term- The Statistics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 372,
372 (1994); The Supreme Court, 1994 Term- The Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340, 340
(1995); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term- The Statistics, 110 HARV. L. REV. 367, 367 (1996);
The Supreme Court, 1996 Term- The Statistics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 431, 431 (1997); The
Supreme Court, 1997 Term- The Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 366 (1998); The Supreme Court, 1998 Term- The Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 400 (1999); The Supreme
Court, 1999 Term- The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 390 (2000); The Supreme Court,
2000 Term- The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539, 539 (2001); The Supreme Court, 2001
Term- The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 453 (2002); The Supreme Court, 2002 TermThe Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REV. 480, 480 (2003); The Supreme Court, 2003 Term- The
Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 497 (2004); The Supreme Court, 2004 Term- The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 420, 420 (2005).
27 See table supra note 26.
28 See table supra note 26.
29 Note, Of High Designs: A Compendium of Proposals to Reduce the Workload of the
Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REV. 307, 310 (1982) (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF
THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1972), reprinted in 57
F.R.D. 573, 581 (1972)) [hereinafter High Designs]. There were other proposals designed
to tackle the time needed to review adequately the growing number of certiorari petitions.
Justice John Paul Stevens promoted two such fixes. Justice Stevens first “called for [the]
establishment of a new court having the sole task of screening certiorari petitions and selecting the docket of the Supreme Court.” High Designs, supra note 29, at 311 (citing John
Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 182 (1982)).
Justice Stevens also proposed to “redefine the review of certiorari petitions to require majority approval for the grant of a writ,” replacing the “rule of four” with “a rule of five.” Id.
at 318 (citing J. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule (Oct. 27, 1982) (James
Madison Lecture delivered at the New York University School of Law) (available on request from the Public Information Office, U.S. Supreme Court)).
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ions, and the stable membership of the Court, though noteworthy
developments on their own,30 in combination have afforded a
unique opportunity to view the institution of the Supreme Court
in a new way. These same nine jurists have begun to focus their
attention on a relatively small number of issues, for example, by
choosing not to accept every question upon which the circuits
have split. While the Court is subject to criticism for allowing too
many important questions to remain unresolved on a national
scale,31 the Justices, perhaps, though not necessarily, by design,32
30 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 570 (2003) (“The second Rehnquist Court
started in October 1994 and is still with us. This Court has had no change in its membership, has decided just half the number of cases the Court did in 1986, and is increasingly
dominated by a single bloc of five Justices.”). Professor Merrill also noted that “the first
Rehnquist Court experienced extensive and frequent changes in membership, while the
second Rehnquist Court has experienced no change in membership—it has functioned
with the same cast of characters now for over eight uninterrupted years.” Id. at 638. See
also Hellman, supra note 21, at 403.
31 See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, A Step In the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit
Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L.
REV. 605, 610 (2003):
The time has come for Congress and the courts to take action to reduce conflicts among the federal appellate courts regarding federal law. The current
system is bursting at the seams as the federal appellate courts and the Supreme Court receive appeals and petitions for writs of certiorari in record
numbers.
See also Split Circuits: A Blog Dedicated to Tracking Developments Concerning Splits
Among the Federal Circuit Courts, http://splitcircuits.blogspot.com/ (last visited Apr. 8,
2006).
32 Professor Merrill has offered this informed speculation:
There is no evidence . . . that William Rehnquist assumed the office of
Chief Justice with any intention to cut back on the number of cases heard by
the Court. As an Associate Justice, Rehnquist was a frequent filer of dissents
from denial of certiorari, implicitly advocating that more, rather than fewer,
cases be heard. On the eve of his appointment, he published an article bemoaning the inability of the Court to decide more cases and urging the creation of
the National Court of Appeals to take up the slack. Moreover, at his confirmation hearings in 1986, he told the Senate “I think the 150 cases [per year] that
we have turned out quite regularly over a period of 10 or 15 years is just about
where we should be at.”

In contrast, we know from published reports that Justice Scalia, from his
early years on the Court, strongly favored reducing the number of cases heard
by the Court in order to allow more time for each case and improve the quality
of the Court’s deliberations.
...
I am not inclined to attribute any deep strategic significance to what I
have surmised to be Justice Scalia’s advocacy of a smaller case load. The decline has little to do with the politically-significant cases, which are too few in
number to explain the shrinkage of the docket we have witnessed. What has
happened is that the number of more routine cases involving statutory interpretation and civil and criminal procedural rights issues has been cut roughly
in half. If pressed to explain Justice Scalia’s motivation for wanting to get rid
of half of the lower-profile cases, I would suggest that it may have something to
do with the fact that he is heavily involved in drafting and revising the opinions that issue under his name. The prospect of doing this against a base of 150
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have offered important commentary on a number of significant
legal issues. These issues include, but are certainly not limited
to: the position and legal status of states in a federal system;33
the importance of original intent;34 the tension between textualism and a more organic view of the words of the Constitution;35
the balance between, and separation of, governmental powers;36
the most effective methods of statutory interpretation;37 the appropriateness of relying on legislative history;38 the relevance of
foreign sources of law;39 the role and status of administrative
agencies;40 and the powers and responsibilities of local governdecisions a year is far more exhausting than doing so against a base of 80 decisions a year. Other Justices who joined the Court during the first Rehnquist
years, including Justices Souter and Breyer, are also heavily involved in the
opinion-production process. So they too might welcome relief from having to
produce their share of an extra seventy opinions, most of which involve rather
routine and unexciting issues.
Merrill, supra note 30, at 643–44 (footnotes omitted).
33 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (“‘The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.’”).
34 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“The Copyright Clause and
First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free expression.”).
35 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 705 n.7 (2000) (“That is virtuoso
lexicography, but it shows only that English is rich enough to give even textualists room
for creative readings.”).
36 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004) (“[T]he position that the
courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of
separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch
of government.”).
37 See, e.g., Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65–66 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Common sense is often more reliable than rote repetition of canons
of statutory construction.”).
38 See, e.g., Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280–
81(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted):
Our opinions using legislative history are often curiously casual, sometimes even careless, in their analysis of what “intent” the legislative history
shows. Perhaps that is because legislative history is in any event a makeweight; the Court really makes up its mind on the basis of other factors. Or
perhaps it is simply hard to maintain a rigorously analytical attitude, when
the point of departure for the inquiry is the fairyland in which legislative history reflects what was in “the Congress’s mind.”
39 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted) (“I disagree with Justice Scalia’s contention that foreign and international law have no place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Over the course of
nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign and international law
as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency.”).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (footnotes omitted)
(“The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s
care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the
agency’s position.”).
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ments.41
From the October 1994 Term through the October 2004
Term, the Justices wrote opinions in nearly seventy cases that
directly addressed the powers and responsibilities of local governments.42 While the great majority of those cases have relatively minimal relevance to the various wet-growth tools reviewed in Part II of this article, there are several cases that
deserve closer attention for the instructive lessons they contain.
IV. GLEANING LESSONS FROM THE COMMENTATORS
During the eleven Terms in which the membership of the
United States Supreme Court remained stable, this body of legal
commentators issued opinions in fourteen cases that provide important guidance for local governments seeking to implement or
enforce wet-growth tools. While only half of these cases actually
concerned land-use planning,43 and only a couple addressed wetgrowth controls,44 the lessons they convey apply to situations far
beyond, though analogous to, the facts of each dispute.
Lesson #1: The Court Looks at Actual Intent and Does Not
Accept Sham Purposes
In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,45 two Kentucky
counties made multiple attempts to post the same version of the
Ten Commandments in their courthouses—first as a freestanding display; then, after the American Civil Liberties Union
brought suit claiming a violation of the Establishment Clause,
surrounded by other religion-related historical texts; and finally,
after switching legal counsel, “by eliminating some documents,
expanding the text set out in another, and adding some new
ones.”46 The five-member majority in McCreary County found
that the counties had violated the first prong of the familiar, but

41 See infra notes 32–154 and accompanying text; see Cook County v. United States,
538 U.S. 119, 133–34 (2003) (wherein the Court declares that local governments may be
held liable for filing false claims in order to obtain federal funds).
42 For a list of these cases, see http://lic.law.ufl.edu/~wolfm/localgovt.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
43 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City
& County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005); City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye
Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001);
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000); City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
44 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
45 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727–28 (2005).
46 Id.
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not universally popular, test derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman:47
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
The McCreary
government entanglement with religion.’”48
County Court found “as seismic as they are unconvincing,” the
counties’ assertions that “true ‘purpose’ is unknowable, and its
search merely an excuse for courts to act selectively and unpredictably in picking out evidence of subjective intent.”49
Given the shifting tactics employed by county officials to
secularize their religious intent, it is no surprise that their counsel sought to discredit the notion that courts can discern purpose.
In essence, the majority suspected that the local governments
were being much less than genuine, noting that:
the Court often does accept governmental statements of purpose, in
keeping with the respect owed in the first instance to such official
claims. But in those unusual cases where the claim was an apparent
sham, or the secular purpose secondary, the unsurprising results have
been findings of no adequate secular object, as against a predominantly religious one.50

In other words, there is a limit of judicial toleration for government officials who employ pretense in their attempts to avoid
constitutional restraints.
Lesson #2: The Court Is Skeptical About Claims to
Property That Are Unsubstantiated by State Law
In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,51 a seven-member majority rejected a lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,52 alleging
that “an individual who has obtained a state-law restraining order has a constitutionally protected property interest in having
the police enforce the restraining order when they have probable
cause to believe it has been violated.”53 The plaintiff, a mother of
three children murdered by her husband, claimed that the town
violated her Due Process rights “because its police department
had ‘an official policy or custom of failing to respond properly to
complaints of restraining order violations’ and ‘tolerated the nonenforcement of restraining orders by its police officers.’”54
Id. at 2735, 2745; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New
York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
49 McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2734.
50 Id. at 2736 (emphasis added).
51 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
52 Id. at 2800, 2802.
53 Id. at 2800.
54 Id. at 2802 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 129a).
47
48
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Reversing an en banc Tenth Circuit opinion recognizing a
procedural due process claim by the plaintiff,55 the Court instructed:
The procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not protect
everything that might be described as a “benefit”: “To have a property
interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire” and “more than a unilateral expectation of it.
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Board
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Such
entitlements are “‘of course, . . . not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law.’”56

Furthermore, the majority explained that “a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in
their discretion.”57 By narrowing the conception of entitlements
the Court in turn reduces the chances that a successful procedural due process claim can be brought against government officials.
Lesson #3: Comprehensive Planning Earns Deference and
Trumps Private Rights-Based Arguments
In one of the Rehnquist Court’s most controversial cases,58
Kelo v. City of New London,59 five Justices upheld the use of eminent domain by the New London Development Corporation in
furtherance of an ambitious economic revitalization plan for
ninety acres in the Fort Trumbull area of the economically distressed Connecticut city.60 The majority, affirming the holding of
the Supreme Court of Connecticut and following two key precedents—Berman v. Parker,61 and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff62—concluded that the real property of the plaintiffs was
taken “for public use.”63 Noting that the “‘Court long ago rejected
any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use
Id. at 2802, 2811.
Id. at 2803 (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972), and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976) (quoting in turn Roth, 408 U.S. at
577)).
57 Id. at 2803.
58 See generally John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1 (discussing the reaction to the decision rendered in Kelo v.
City of New London).
59 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
60 Id. at 2658–59.
61 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (allowing the use of eminent domain as part of a redevelopment
project for a blighted neighborhood).
62 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (allowing the use of condemnation to transfer fee interests
from landlords to tenants in order to combat the evils of “land oligopoly”).
63 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658, 2660–61, 2669.
55
56
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for the general public,’”64 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for
the majority, explained that the case “turns on the question
whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’
Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly,
reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative
judgments in this field.”65
In fact, the city’s development plan was the focus of the majority’s discussion in several key parts of the opinion,66 particularly the following passage:
Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that
the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic
rejuvenation is entitled to our deference. The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide
appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no means
limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue. As with other exercises in urban planning and development, the City is endeavoring to
coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses
of land, with the hope that they will form a whole greater than the
sum of its parts. To effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state
statute that specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic development. Given the comprehensive character of
the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the
limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a
piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that
plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged
here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.67

The result was deference to state and local officials who engage
in comprehensive planning efforts, despite serious claims of private property rights violations.68

Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244).
Id. at 2663 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., id. at 2658 (“the city of New London approved a development plan”), id.
at 2659 (“the NLDC finalized an integrated development plan, “ “[t]he development plan
encompasses seven parcels,” “NLDC intended the development plan to capitalize on the
arrival of the Pfizer facility,” “the plan was also designed to make the City more attractive
and to create leisure and recreational opportunities”), id. at 2661 (“The takings before us,
however, would be executed pursuant to a ‘carefully considered’ development plan”), and
id. at 2667 (“Such a one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an
integrated development plan, is not presented in this case.”).
67 Id. at 2664–65 (footnote omitted).
68 See, e.g., id. at 2684–85 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is backwards to adopt a
searching standard of constitutional review for nontraditional property interests, such as
welfare benefits . . . while deferring to the legislature’s determination as to what constitutes a public use when it exercises the power of eminent domain, and thereby invades
individuals’ traditional rights in real property.”).
64
65
66
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Lesson #4: Ripeness Requirements Continue to Be
Significant Hurdles for Those Bringing Regulatory
Takings Challenges
Although in theory regulations that go “too far” amount to
unconstitutional takings, 69 in practice it remains a difficult task
for a property owner to receive just compensation or other relief
for allegedly confiscatory land regulations. That task was made
even more arduous by the Supreme Court in 2005, when it issued
its holding in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San
Francisco.70 The City Planning Commission assessed a $567,000
“conversion fee” against the hotel for changing residential hotel
units into tourist units, and the result was a set of lawsuits
brought by the hotel owners: the first suit was a mandamus action in state court, followed a month later by a federal case alleging (among other claims) a regulatory taking.71
The federal district court granted summary judgment in the
government’s favor; in the Ninth Circuit, the hotel owners requested that the federal court abstain and not hear their federal
claims, so the parties returned to state court.72 However, the hotel owners made a fatal tactical error. Instead of reserving their
takings claims, as instructed by the court of appeals, the owners
actually raised claims before the federal district court that closely
resembled those they were supposed to have reserved.73 Ultimately, the California Supreme Court, applying a “reasonable relationship” test, denied the facial and as-applied challenges to
the city’s Hotel Conversion Ordinance (HCO).74 When the hotel
owners returned to federal court, they did not get a warm reception, as the district court and court of appeals found that the
owners’ takings claims had been precluded.75
The specific issue before the United States Supreme Court
was “whether federal courts may craft an exception to the full
faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, for claims brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”76 Complicating
the matter was the fact that the hotel owners were required to go
to state court in accordance with the Court’s decision in William-

69 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule
at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking.”).
70 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005).
71 Id. at 2496–97.
72 Id. at 2497.
73 Id. at 2499–2500.
74 Id. at 2500.
75 Id. at 2499–2500.
76 Id. at 2495.
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son County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,77 a
1985 case holding “that takings claims are not ripe until a State
fails ‘to provide adequate compensation for the taking.’”78 Nevertheless, the San Remo majority was ultimately unsympathetic
with property owners who had failed to make wise litigation decisions:
At base, petitioners’ claim amounts to little more than the concern
that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to state-court proceedings that
are not chosen, but are instead required in order to ripen federal takings claims. Whatever the merits of that concern may be, we are not
free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the
availability of a federal forum. The Court of Appeals was correct to
decline petitioners’ invitation to ignore the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738.79

The road to recovery for a regulatory taking would remain, for
the foreseeable future, a long, winding, often frustrating path.
Lesson #5: The Text Trumps Legislative History
Efforts by government officials to reduce air pollution in
metropolitan Los Angeles were negated by the Supreme Court’s
finding of federal preemption in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v.
South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. District.80 In 2000, the South
Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) was charged
with “developing and implementing a ‘comprehensive basinwide
air quality management plan’ to reduce emission levels and
thereby achieve and maintain ‘state and federal ambient air
quality standards.’”81 SCAQMD adopted six Fleet Rules (for vehicles such as street sweepers, passenger vehicles, public transit
vehicles, and others) specifying the “the types of vehicles that
fleet operators must purchase or lease when adding or replacing
fleet vehicles.”82 The Fleet Rules mandated the purchase or lease
of alternative-fuel vehicles or of vehicles, such as Low-Emission
and Zero-Emission Vehicles, among others, that “meet certain
emission specifications established by the California Air Resources Board (CARB).”83
The Engine Manufacturers responded in turn with a federal
suit, “claiming that the Fleet Rules are pre-empted by § 209 of
the CAA [Clean Air Act], which prohibits the adoption or attempted enforcement of any state or local ‘standard relating to
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

473 U.S. 172 (1985).
San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195).
Id. at 2507.
541 U.S. 246, 248, 258–59 (2004).
Id. at 249 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40402(e) (West 1996)).
Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 248–49.
Id. at 250, 250 n.1, 250 n.3.
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the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines.’”84 The district court granted summary judgment to SCAQMD,85 and the court of appeals affirmed,86 but the
Supreme Court reversed in an opinion for eight Justices written
by Justice Scalia.87
The Court’s decision was directed primarily at the word
“standard,” the key term found in § 209(a).88 Turning to one of
his most trusty interpretive sources—”Webster’s Second”89—
Justice Scalia noted:
Today, as in 1967 when § 209(a) became law, “standard” is defined as
that which “is established by authority, custom, or general consent, as
a model or example; criterion; test.” Webster’s Second New International Dictionary 2455 (1945). The criteria referred to in § 209(a) relate to the emission characteristics of a vehicle or engine. To meet
them the vehicle or engine must not emit more than a certain amount
of a given pollutant, must be equipped with a certain type of pollutioncontrol device, or must have some other design feature related to the
control of emissions. This interpretation is consistent with the use of
“standard” throughout Title II of the CAA (which governs emissions
from moving sources) to denote requirements such as numerical emission levels with which vehicles or engines must comply, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)(3)(B)(ii) [42 USCS § 7521(a)(3)(B)(ii)], or emission-control
technology with which they must be equipped, e.g., § 7521(a)(6).90

Because it was “likely that at least certain aspects of the Fleet
Id. at 251 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000)).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 252–59.
For other Supreme Court opinions in which Justice Scalia relied on the second
edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary to define terms, many of which are
parts of everyday usage, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004) (“gerrymander”);
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (“origin”);
Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 264, 298 (2003) (“enact” and “until”); Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776 (2002) (“impartial”); Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass’n., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (“public health”); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528
U.S. 320, 333–34 (2000) (“abridge”); Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998)
(“eligible” and “participate”); Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div. v. United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of America, 523 U.S. 653, 656–57 (1998)
(“for”); Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400–01 (1998) (“statement”); Allentown
Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 522 U.S. 359, 367, 367 n.2 (1998)
(“doubt” and “objective”); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (“subject to”); Walters
v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207–08 (1997) (“have”); Capitol Square Review
& Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995) (“endorsement”); Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (“market”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227–28, 242 n.5 (1994) (“modify”); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129,
131 (1993) (“conviction”); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274
(1993) (“invidious”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (“unusual”); Chan v.
Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128 (1989) (“irregularity”); Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 564 (1988) (“substantial”).
90 Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 252–53.
84
85
86
87
88
89
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Rules are pre-empted” by § 209,”91 the decision of the court of appeals was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.92
In contrast, Justice David Souter, the sole dissenter, argued
that “legislative history should inform interpretive choice, and
the legislative history of this preemption provision shows that
Congress’s purpose in passing it was to stop States from imposing regulatory requirements that directly limited what manufacturers could sell.”93 Justice Souter also highlighted the difference
between his approach to the case and the majority’s:
In sum, I am reading “standard” in a practical way that keeps the
Act’s preemption of standards in tune with Congress’s object in providing for preemption, which was to prevent the States from forcing
manufacturers to produce engines with particular characteristics as a
legal condition of sale. The majority’s approach eliminates this consideration of legislative purposes, as well as the presumption against
preemption, by acting as though anything that could possibly be described as a standard must necessarily be a “standard” for the purposes of the Act: a standard is a standard is a standard. The majority
reveals its misalliance with Gertrude Stein throughout its response to
this dissent.94

Even though the legislative history strongly indicated that the
Fleet Rules were consistent with congressional intent, the words
in the text of the preemptive provision ultimately controlled.
Lesson #6: Judges Appreciate the Administrative
Burdens Faced by Local Officials
In City of Los Angeles v. David,95 a car owner “made a federal
case out of it” when he had to wait twenty-seven days for a hearing at which the city denied his claim that trees blocked his view
of a “no parking sign.”96 In a Per Curiam opinion, the Court rejected Edwin David’s claim “that the city, in failing to provide a
sufficiently prompt hearing, had violated his federal right to ‘due
process of law,’”97 reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision “that the
Constitution required the city to provide an earlier paymentrecovery hearing, perhaps within 48 hours of the towing and at
least within 5 days.”98
Central to the Supreme Court’s decision were the practical
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 258.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 261 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 263–64 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
538 U.S. 715 (2003).
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
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difficulties faced by a large city in processing hearings of this
kind:
The nature of the city’s interest in delay is one of administrative necessity. The city points out that it “conducts more than a thousand vehicle impound hearings annually.” Pet. for Cert. 8. It holds about five
percent of these hearings—those involving individuals who are unable
to afford the impoundment fees—within 48 hours. It “takes time to
organize hearings: there are only so many courtrooms and presiding
officials; the city has to contact the towing officer and arrange for his
appearance; the city may have to find a substitute to cover that officer’s responsibilities while he attends the hearing.” And the Ninth
Circuit’s holding, which presumably would require the city to schedule
annually 1,000 or more hearings, instead of 50 hearings, within a 48hour (or 5-day) time limit, will prove burdensome. The administrative
resources available to modern police departments are not limitless.99

The protections afforded private property owners by the Due
Process Clause, far from absolute, are assessed in relation to the
significant administrative tasks performed by local government
and other public officials.
Lesson #7: Congress May Subject Municipalities to Suit in
State Court Without Violating “State Sovereignty”
In 1996, Susan Jinks, the widow of a man who died in a
Richland County, South Carolina, detention center, brought
claims in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
South Carolina Tort Claims Act.100 By the time the federal trial
court dismissed both claims, the state’s two-year statute of limitations had run, which was the basis of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s reversal of a state court jury verdict in Jinks’s favor.101 The United States Supreme Court, in Jinks v. Richland
County, agreed to hear the case after the state high court “held
that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which required the state statute of limitation to be tolled for the period during which petitioner’s cause
of action had previously been pending in federal court, is unconstitutional as applied to lawsuits brought against a State’s political subdivisions.”102
First, Justice Scalia, in an opinion for a unanimous Court,
dismissed the notion that Congress had exceeded its enumerated
powers in enacting § 1367(d).103 The opinion then moved to the
respondent county’s assertion “that § 1367(d) should not be in99 Id. at 718 (quoting David v. City of Los Angeles, 307 F.3d 1143, 1149 (2002) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev’d, 538 U.S. 751 (2003)).
100 Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 460 (2003).
101 Id. at 460.
102 Id. at 458.
103 Id. at 457, 461.
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terpreted to apply to claims brought against a State’s political
subdivisions,” which the Court found “also to be without
merit.”104 The body of Rehnquist Court commentators, which in
other cases supported an expansive notion of sovereign immunity,105 made an important distinction between the elevated
status of a state and its more vulnerable municipalities:
In respondent’s view, § 1367(d)’s extension of the time period in which
a State’s political subdivisions may be sued constitutes an impermissible abrogation of “sovereign immunity.” That is not so. Although we
have held that Congress lacks authority under Article I to override a
State’s immunity from suit in its own courts, see Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 . . . (1999), it may subject a municipality to suit in state court
if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise of its enumerated powers,
see id., at 756 . . . . Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period with respect to state-law causes of action brought against municipalities, but
we see no reason why that represents a greater intrusion on “state
sovereignty” than the undisputed power of Congress to override statelaw immunity when subjecting a municipality to suit under a federal
cause of action. In either case, a State’s authority to set the conditions
upon which its political subdivisions are subject to suit in its own
courts must yield to the enactments of Congress. This is not an encroachment on “state sovereignty,” but merely the consequence of
those cases (which respondent does not ask us to overrule) which hold
that municipalities, unlike States, do not enjoy a constitutionally protected immunity from suit.106

In other words, for immunity purposes, the hierarchy of nonfederal governments remains basically intact.
Lesson #8: It Takes Egregious or Arbitrary Government
Conduct for Property Owners to Prove Substantive Due
Process Violations
In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation, a unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, found that an Ohio city did not violate
an affordable housing developer’s equal protection or due process
rights when city officials submitted a referendum repealing the
ordinance approving the developer’s site plan.107 Although the
developer was successful in convincing the Ohio Supreme Court
that the ordinance was not a proper subject of a referendum under state law108 and in advancing its constitutional claims in the
Id. at 465.
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (“[T]he powers delegated to
Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to
subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts.”).
106 Jinks, 538 U.S. at 465–66.
107 538 U.S. 188, 190–91, 199 (2003).
108 Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 697 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ohio
104
105
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federal Sixth Circuit,109 the Justices were much less sympathetic.
The developer’s failure to offer proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose, in accordance with the requirements of
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,110 proved fatal to the equal protection claim.111 On
the due process claim, while the Sixth Circuit had held, “as a
threshold matter, that respondents had a legitimate claim of entitlement to the building permits, and therefore a property interest in those permits, in light of the city council’s approval of the
site plan,”112 the Supreme Court felt no need to “decide whether
respondents possessed a property interest in the building permits, because the city engineer’s refusal to issue the permits
while the petition was pending in no sense constituted egregious
or arbitrary government conduct.”113 The Justices were equally
unimpressed with the developer’s assertion “that the City’s submission of an administrative land-use determination to the charter’s referendum procedures constituted per se arbitrary conIn this way, the Court sent a strong signal to
duct.”114
landowners that the protections afforded by Due Process Clause
were reserved for those penalized by the most “egregious” and
“arbitrary” instances of official misconduct.
Lesson #9: The Court Endorses Careful Planning for
Environmentally Sensitive Lands
One of the most important regulatory takings cases decided
by the legal commentators comprising the Rehnquist Court involved a comprehensive and controversial wet-growth regulatory
scheme to protect the pristine waters of Lake Tahoe. In TahoeSierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,115 five colleagues joined Justice Stevens in declining to
hold that “a moratorium on development imposed during the
process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a
per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.”116 The delays
faced by landowners seeking to develop their property were not
1998).

109 Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 263 F.3d 627, 645
(6th Cir. 2001), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 538 U.S. 188 (2003).
110 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
111 Cuyahoga Falls, 538 U.S. at 194.
112 Id. at 198.
113 Id.
114 Id. “The subjection of the site-plan ordinance to the City’s referendum process, regardless of whether that ordinance reflected an administrative or legislative decision, did
not constitute per se arbitrary government conduct in violation of due process.” Id. at 199.
115 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
116 Id. at 305–06, 342–43.
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insignificant:
This case actually involves two moratoria ordered by respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to maintain the status quo
while studying the impact of development on Lake Tahoe and designing a strategy for environmentally sound growth. The first, Ordinance
81-5, was effective from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983,
whereas the second more restrictive Resolution 83-21 was in effect
from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984. As a result of these two directives, virtually all development on a substantial portion of the
property subject to TRPA’s jurisdiction was prohibited for a period of
32 months.117

Nevertheless, the Court concluded “that the interest in ‘fairness
and justice’ will be best served by relying on the familiar Penn
Central [ad hoc balancing] approach when deciding cases like
this, rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical rule.”118
The Tahoe Sierra Court’s decision not to recognize another
category of per se regulatory taking can be attributed in a significant way to the majority’s recognition of and respect for careful
planning, especially in environmentally sensitive regions. This
aspect of the decision is illustrated by the following excerpts from
the majority opinion:
A narrower rule that excluded the normal delays associated with
processing permits, or that covered only delays of more than a year,
would certainly have a less severe impact on prevailing practices, but
it would still impose serious financial constraints on the planning
process. . . . [M]oratoria like Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 are
used widely among land-use planners to preserve the status quo while
formulating a more permanent development strategy. In fact, the consensus in the planning community appears to be that moratoria, or
“interim development controls” as they are often called, are an essential tool of successful development. . . .
The interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking by regulatory
agencies counsels against adopting a per se rule that would impose
such severe costs on their deliberations. Otherwise, the financial constraints of compensating property owners during a moratorium may
force officials to rush through the planning process or to abandon the
practice altogether. To the extent that communities are forced to
abandon using moratoria, landowners will have incentives to develop
their property quickly before a comprehensive plan can be enacted,
thereby fostering inefficient and ill-conceived growth. . . .
We would create a perverse system of incentives were we to hold
that landowners must wait for a takings claim to ripen so that planners can make well-reasoned decisions while, at the same time, holding that those planners must compensate landowners for the delay.
117
118

Id. at 306.
Id. at 342.
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Indeed, the interest in protecting the decisional process is even
stronger when an agency is developing a regional plan than when it is
considering a permit for a single parcel.119

The message to regulators and landowners that emerges
from this decision is that, in order to maintain the proper equilibrium between private property rights and public needs, a balancing test that considers the specific circumstances in which the
regulatory power is exercised is, except in limited circumstances,
more appropriate than a per se approach.
Lesson #10: Regulators Must Ensure That Landowners
Retain Something More Than Token Value
In a second wet growth case, a five-Justice majority, in an
opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, refused to find that
a landowner whose real property retained $200,000 in development value even after the application of state wetlands restrictions was entitled to bring a per se regulatory takings challenge
alleging a “total deprivation.”120 Although the majority in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island remanded the case for a determination of
whether the landowner could prevail under an alternative takings test,121 before it let go of the dispute, the Court explained
that the fact that a property owner acquires a parcel after a regulation goes into effect does not necessarily preclude a regulatory
takings challenge.122 Justice Kennedy cautioned: “[a] blanket
rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right
when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord
with the duty to compensate for what is taken.”123
The Palazzolo decision contains another, potentially important victory for landowners affected by environmental regulations. While, as noted above, the property in the case before the
Court retained significant development value, there may be occaId. at 337–40 (footnotes omitted).
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 610, 616, 632 (2001).
See id. at 632 (“The claims under the Penn Central analysis were not examined,
and for this purpose the case should be remanded.”); see also Peter B. Lord, Westerly Wetlands Dispute Finally Over, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Sept. 14, 2005, at B3:
Anthony Palazzolo’s wetlands dispute with the state of Rhode Island has
grown in recent decades to become one of the state’s longest-running and most
widely studied legal cases. This week, it quietly came to an end. . . .
119
120
121

During 23 years of administrative proceedings and 17 years of litigation,
Palazzolo has tried to win permission to build his subdivision on the south
shores of Winnapaug Pond, just north of Atlantic Avenue in Westerly. . . .
The Supreme Court sent the case back to the Rhode Island Superior Court
for further consideration. After more testimony, Superior Court Judge Edwin
Gale issued a 32-page ruling in July that went against Palazzolo once again.
122 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
123 Id. at 628.

03) 233-264 WOLF (PAGENUM, HYPH, EN&EM).DOC

256

Chapman Law Review

6/30/2006 12:47:12 PM

[Vol. 9:233

sions in which a landowner suffers a dramatic, though less-thantotal, deprivation.
In that event, the Court instructed,
“[a]ssuming a taking is otherwise established, a State may not
evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner
is left with a token interest.”124
Lesson #11: Judges Will Not Tolerate Backdoor Strategies
Persistence and creativity did not pay off for Santa Fe High
School officials in Texas, whose practice of electing a school chaplain to deliver Christian prayers over a public address system before varsity football games was declared to be in violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.125 School officials then opted for an alternative system, which they worked out
over the summer and fall of 1995:
The August policy, which was titled “Prayer at Football
Games,” . . . authorized two student elections, the first to determine
whether “invocations” should be delivered, and the second to select the
spokesperson to deliver them. Like the July policy, it contained two
parts, an initial statement that omitted any requirement that the content of the invocation be “nonsectarian and nonproselytising,” and a
fallback provision that automatically added that limitation if the preferred policy should be enjoined. . . .
The final policy (October policy) is essentially the same as the August policy, though it omits the word “prayer” from its title, and refers
to “messages” and “statements” as well as “invocations.” It is the validity of that policy that is before us.126

Six Justices, in an opinion penned by Justice Stevens, were not
convinced that the school had gone far enough.127 In Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, the Court concluded that
“this policy does not provide the District with the constitutional
safe harbor it sought.”128
One of the messages sent by the Rehnquist Court commentators is that it is a difficult task for government officials to purge
an invalid policy of its constitutional defects. Going back to the
drawing board with the intent to change the letter but not the
spirit of a tainted policy is insufficient. Context and history are
important:
This case comes to us as the latest step in developing litigation
brought as a challenge to institutional practices that unquestionably
violated the Establishment Clause. One of those practices was the

124
125
126
127
128

Id. at 631.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294, 301 (2000).
Id. at 297–98.
Id. at 292, 301.
Id. at 317.
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District’s long-established tradition of sanctioning student-led prayer
at varsity football games. The narrow question before us is whether
implementation of the October policy insulates the continuation of
such prayers from constitutional scrutiny. It does not. Our inquiry
into this question not only can, but must, include an examination of
the circumstances surrounding its enactment.129

Local governments should be advised that trying to sneak a defective program or policy in through the back door is ultimately a
formula for failure.
Lesson #12: The Equal Protection Clause Remains
Potentially Effective as an Avenue of Relief Against
Municipalities That Abuse Regulatory Power
When Grace and Thaddeus Olech requested that the Village
of Willowbrook, Illinois, which the Olechs and others had unsuccessfully sued in an unrelated action, tie their property to the
public water supply, local government officials responded with a
condition that departed from the norm:130
The Village at first conditioned the connection on the Olechs granting
the Village a 33-foot easement. The Olechs objected, claiming that the
Village only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners
seeking access to the water supply. After a 3-month delay, the Village
relented and agreed to provide water service with only a 15-foot easement.131

The federal district court dismissed Grace Olech’s claim that the
village had violated the Equal Protection Clause (her husband
had died),132 but the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that “a
plaintiff can allege an equal protection violation by asserting that
state action was motivated solely by a ‘spiteful effort to “get” him
for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.’”133
The Supreme Court, in its per curium opinion in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech answered in the affirmative the following question: “whether the Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause
of action on behalf of a ‘class of one’ where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group.”134
Id. at 315.
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563 (2000) (per curium).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 563–64.(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), and quoting in turn
Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995)).
134 Olech, 528 U.S. at 563–65. The Court noted that, in actuality, other neighbors who
had joined the Olechs in their previous lawsuit had also been asked to dedicate a 33-foot
easement. Id. at 564 n.*. This led the Justices to observe, “Whether the complaint alleges
a class of one or of five is of no consequence because we conclude that the number of individuals in a class is immaterial for equal protection analysis.” Id.
129
130
131
132
133
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While it remains difficult for landowners to bring successful
Equal Protection claims, without the benefit of strict scrutiny afforded plaintiffs in cases involving a suspect class or fundamental rights,135 Olech is an important reminder that property owners are still protected from government abuse:
Olech’s complaint can fairly be construed as alleging that the Village
intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of connecting her property to the municipal water supply where the Village required only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situated property
owners. The complaint also alleged that the Village’s demand was “irrational and wholly arbitrary” and that the Village ultimately connected her property after receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot easement. These allegations, quite apart from the Village’s subjective
motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional
equal protection analysis.136

Even if the regulatory takings movement is on the decline,137 local land use regulators do not have a license to abuse or treat unfairly landowners and developers.
Lesson #13: Multiple Refusals of a Landowner’s
Reasonable Development Requests Could Lead to a
Substantial Jury Award
Over a five-year period in the early 1980s, Del Monte Dunes
and it predecessor in interest, landowners in the city of Monterey, California, submitted nineteen site plans in an effort to
create a residential development on its 37.6-acre oceanfront parcel.138 Although the planning commission’s professional staff recommended approval of the developer’s proposal in 1985 to devote
nearly half of the site to public open space and only 5.1 acres to
buildings and patios, the commission rejected the recommendation.139 The next year, the city council followed suit, offering the
following reasons for its denial:
[T]he council made general findings that the landowners had not provided adequate access for the development (even though the landowners had twice changed the specific access plans to comply with the
135 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988) (“Unless a
statute provokes ‘strict judicial scrutiny’ because it interferes with a ‘fundamental right’
or discriminates against a ‘suspect class,’ it will ordinarily survive an equal protection attack so long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”).
136 Olech, 528 U.S. at 565 (citation omitted).
137 See, for example, the recent local government victories in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v.
City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005), and Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
138 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 694, 698
(1999).
139 Id. at 696–97.
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city’s demands and maintained they could satisfy the city’s new objections if granted an extension), that the plan’s layout would damage
the environment (even though the location of the development on the
property was necessitated by the city’s demands for a public beach,
view corridors, and a buffer zone next to the state park), and that the
plan would disrupt the habitat of the Smith’s Blue Butterfly (even
though the plan would remove the encroaching ice plant and preserve
or restore buckwheat habitat on almost half of the property, and even
though only one larva had ever been found on the property).140

Del Monte Dunes pursued equal protection, regulatory takings,
and due process claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the city
in federal district court.141 Eventually, a jury returned verdicts
in the landowner’s favor on the first two grounds, and awarded
$1.45 million in damages.142
When the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the city brought its case to
the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the following questions:
(1) whether issues of liability were properly submitted to the jury on
Del Monte Dunes’ regulatory takings claim, (2) whether the Court of
Appeals impermissibly based its decision on a standard that allowed
the jury to reweigh the reasonableness of the city’s land-use decision,
and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in assuming that the
rough-proportionality standard of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 . . . (1994), applied to this case.143

While all members of the Court in City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey Ltd. agreed that the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the Dolan test was “unnecessary” and “irrelevant to [the
Supreme Court’s] disposition of the case,”144 there was a five-four
split over the legitimacy of submitting the regulatory takings
claim to a jury, with the majority holding in the affirmative.145
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concluded that:
to the extent Del Monte Dunes’ challenge was premised on unreasonable governmental action, the theory argued and tried to the jury was
that the city’s denial of the final development permit was inconsistent
not only with the city’s general ordinances and policies but even with
the shifting ad hoc restrictions previously imposed by the city. Del
Monte Dunes’ argument, in short, was not that the city had followed
its zoning ordinances and policies but rather that it had not done so.
As is often true in § 1983 actions, the disputed questions were
whether the government had denied a constitutional right in acting
outside the bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any result-

140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at 697–98.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 702.
See id. at 692, 702–03.
See id. at 692, 720–22.

03) 233-264 WOLF (PAGENUM, HYPH, EN&EM).DOC

260

Chapman Law Review

6/30/2006 12:47:12 PM

[Vol. 9:233

ing damages. These were questions for the jury.146

The result was a major financial disincentive to local governments that misuse their significant powers to approve some development proposals subject to shifting conditions, and to reject
other proposals on the basis of unsupportable or highly suspicious rationales.
Lesson #14: Immunity for Local Legislators Is the Same as
That of Their Federal and State Counterparts
In Bogan v. Scott-Harris, Justice Clarence Thomas, writing
for a unanimous body of legal commentators, reversed the First
Circuit’s affirmance of a jury verdict against the mayor (Daniel
Bogan) and the vice-president of the city council, Marilyn
Roderick, of Fall River, Massachusetts. 147 The city officials were
sued by Janet Scott- Harris, the former administrator of the
city’s Department of Health and Human Services, whose position
was eliminated after she brought termination charges against a
politically connected employee, Dorothy Biltcliffe, who had made
racial and ethnic slurs directed at her (Biltcliffe’s) colleagues.148
In her suit, Scott-Harris “alleged that the elimination of her position was motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate
against her for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing
the complaint against Biltcliffe.”149 The plaintiff was successful
in obtaining a favorable jury verdict on First Amendment
grounds; the trial and appellate courts rejected the defendant officials’ claims that they were entitled to legislative immunity.150
The Supreme Court disagreed:
It is well established that federal, state, and regional legislators are
entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative
activities. In this case, petitioners argue that they, as local officials
performing legislative functions, are entitled to the same protection.
They further argue that their acts of introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance eliminating the government office held by respondent constituted legislative activities. We agree on both counts and
therefore reverse the judgment below.151

In fact, the Court observed that the officials’ acts “were, in form,
quintessentially legislative,”152 and because “the ordinance, in
substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.”153
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Id. at 722.
523 U.S. 44, 46–48 (1998).
Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47–48.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 55.
Id.
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In this instance, the Court found convincing reasons for
treating local lawmakers like their state and federal counterparts, who, according to precedent, are entitled to absolute legislative immunity:
Absolute immunity for local legislators under § 1983 finds support
not only in history, but also in reason. The rationales for according
absolute immunity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply
with equal force to local legislators. Regardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited
by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability.
Furthermore, the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time
citizen-legislator remains commonplace. And the threat of liability
may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige
and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil
liability.154

In the eyes of the Court, local legislators, who often find themselves threats of lawsuits by disgruntled landowners, are entitled
to a significant privilege accorded those who are elected to serve
in state capitals and Washington, D.C.
V. APPLYING THE COMMENTATORS’ LESSONS IN HYDRO CITY
As we return to our hypothetical municipality—Hydro City—
it is helpful to consider the Supreme Court Commentators’ lessons in context. Consider the following four scenarios involving
the implementation of wet-growth tools.
Scenario A
Hydro City officials have decided to be more rigorous in their inspections during pre-construction and construction phases and to assess
additional fines in the event of violations. Some of the developers with
poor compliance track records have filed suit against the city and the
individual officials, claiming that they (developers) have a property
right to fair enforcement of land regulations.

City officials would be wise to consider the following four lessons in planning their defense for possible lawsuits by these developers: First, the Court is skeptical about claims to property
that are unsubstantiated by state law (Lesson #2). A naked assertion of a “property right to fair enforcement” should not be
deemed sufficient to trigger judicial concern. Second, the Commentators have emphasized that comprehensive planning earns
deference and trumps private rights-based arguments (Lesson
#3). If city officials are acting in accordance with standard pro-

154

Id. at 52 (citations omitted).
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cedures in support of published plans, they reduce the likelihood
of judicial interference. Third, it takes egregious or arbitrary
government conduct for property owners to prove substantive
due process violations (Lesson #8). The enforcement of otherwise
valid regulations against landowners is not the kind of government activity that triggers heightened judicial scrutiny. The private party challenging the regulation carries a heavy burden in
the face of significant judicial deference. Fourth, immunity for
local legislators is the same as that of their federal and state
counterparts (Lesson #14). While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides
strong incentives to sue local governments and their officials for
constitutional torts, local lawmakers are protected from disgruntled landowners who claim that their constitutional rights have
been violated by the enactment of faulty ordinances or by other
legislative acts.
Scenario B
SuperMegaMart has acquired land for a new discount retail facility on
the city’s north side. The city has responded by imposing a six-month
moratorium on permits for big-box stores, ostensibly pending the drafting and adoption of a new set of regulations for 100,000+ square-feet
stores. When the first moratorium was about to expire, a second sixmonth moratorium followed. While no real work has been performed
on the ordinance, the city is considering a third moratorium.

Four of the lessons from the Court Commentators indicate
that Hydro City officials are on shaky ground. First, the court
looks at actual intent and does not accept sham purposes (Lesson
#1). As each month passes without the introduction of an actual
ordinance, the chances grow that a reviewing court will see
through this charade. Second, the Justices will not tolerate backdoor strategies (Lesson #11). Store counsel can effectively use
the legislative history of the series of moratoria in a court challenge brought against the city. Third, the Equal Protection
Clause remains potentially effective as an avenue of relief
against municipalities that abuse regulatory power (Lesson #12).
It is possible that a court will find that local officials have crossed
the line between careful deliberation and unreasonable, retributive behavior. Fourth, multiple refusals of a landowner’s reasonable development requests could lead to a substantial jury award
(Lesson #13). Members of a jury in a § 1983 case, introduced to a
landowner complying with existing land-use regulations who has
met with a non-responsive or even belligerent response, could inflict costly damage on the taxpayers of Hydro City.
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Scenario C
No new permanent buildings are permitted in buffer zones bordering
the river, and owners of existing structures may not make additions or
improvements. Owners who can show a seventy-five percent reduction
in value can apply for a variance. Owners who can show a ninety percent reduction will be given rights to develop non-sensitive properties
elsewhere.

There are three lessons from the Court that indicate the difficulties local governments face when implementing environmental regulations that have a significant impact on land values
and uses. First, ripeness requirements continue to be significant
hurdles for those bringing regulatory takings challenges (Lesson
#4). Landowners and developers bringing regulatory takings
challenges often find themselves forced to make difficult and
time-consuming strategic choices concerning the choice of forum
and the need to request permission or a variance after being denied relief initially (or even repeatedly). Second, the Court endorses careful planning for environmentally sensitive lands (Lesson #9). Courts have signaled their support for the development
of comprehensive programs directed to reap defined and concrete
environmental benefits for the entire community. Third, regulators must ensure that landowners retain something more than
token value (Lesson #10). There is a point at which the financial
burdens carried by one or a group of landowners are deemed too
onerous, and local regulators must be aware of the general and
specific effects of their actions.
Scenario D
City officials, concerned about water consumption, pass an ordinance
that imposes a sliding scale—tying costs to usage (the more usage, the
higher the per-unit cost). In order to secure enough votes to pass the
ordinance, sponsors of the ordinance exempted existing users and other
in-state companies from the new scheme. Lawsuits are threatened.

The Commentators have provided three lessons that address
the fairness questions raised by these hypothetical facts. First,
the text trumps legislative history (Lesson #5). If a piece of legislation creates unfair or illegal categories, even the best of intentions preceding its enactment will be deemed irrelevant. Second,
judges appreciate the administrative burdens faced by local officials (Lesson #6). Though a separate branch, the judiciary is not
unmindful of the significant challenges facing local legislatures
today, when raising taxes is extremely difficult (and potentially
fatal to a political career) and when financial support from Washington, D.C. is often insubstantial. Third, Congress may subject
municipalities to suit in state court without violating “state sov-
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ereignty” (Lesson #7). Unlike the states who created them (and
have the power to alter their powers and boundaries), municipalities are vulnerable to costly and otherwise injurious litigation. This fact alone should lead to caution by local officials when
they create distinctions that leave some landowners outside the
benefited class.
VI. ON THE THRESHOLD OF CHANGE
Only time will tell whether recent changes to the Court’s
erstwhile stable membership (Roberts for Rehnquist and Alito for
O’Connor) will mean a return to larger numbers of opinions, the
formation of new alliances, or the creation of new, internal, institutional developments. For now and the foreseeable future, local
government officials engaged in or considering the implementation of innovative wet-growth controls can benefit from heeding
the lessons of the body of legal commentators comprising the
Rehnquist Court over its last eleven Terms.
Considered together, the fourteen lessons caution a balanced
approach to local, environmentally based regulations that have
the potential not only to protect sensitive water bodies and lands
and to benefit the human and nonhuman life that share our watersheds, but also to reduce the value and potential productive
use of land by owners who are particularly burdened by even the
wisest regulatory tools. This balance is suggested in the Court’s
skepticism about sham purposes and back-door methods on the
one hand, and its generous deference to local officials on the
other. The balance is embodied in the Justices’ refusal to recognize municipal sovereignty, while shielding local lawmakers with
absolute immunity. Most importantly, the balance is reflected in
the Rehnquist Court commentators’ strong endorsement of comprehensive land-use and environmental planning, while opening
the door to relief for landowners who are left with no more than
token value or who are mistreated by arbitrary and nonresponsive public servants. It is this author’s hope that, when we
look back on the work product of the Roberts Court after it establishes its institutional persona, the same kind of beneficial balance will be readily apparent.

